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KEY FINDINGS 
• The main empirical findings are summarised in Table I below. They are based on two measures: 
(i) the probability that a country will enter into economic crisis as a consequence of the current 
financial turmoil; and (ii) an indicator reflecting the relevance and vulnerability of countries to 
negative transmission effects from the crisis. 
• The table reveals that some Danida programme countries face a higher than 10% probability of 
entering a crisis. They are: Vietnam (19%), Egypt (18%) and Nicaragua (12%). This reflects their 
comparatively deeper global integration in world markets alongside indications of greater 
macroeconomic or financial vulnerability. 
• A watch list of countries is constructed containing countries with high scores across the two 
crisis measures. Vietnam and Nicaragua are the only two Danida programme countries to enter 
this list. Specific fragile states such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Sudan and Burundi also appear and 
merit concern due to potential regional and strategic repercussions. 
Table I: Crisis measures for watch list and selected Danida programme countries 
Crisis measures 
Danida Watch list Probability Indicator 
Maldives 0 1 80 2.2 
Sri Lanka 0 1 58 0.9 
Pakistan 0 1 36 0.7 
Moldova 0 1 29 1.4 
Sudan 0 1 27 0.7 
Grenada 0 1 24 1.9 
Burundi 0 1 21 1.2 
Vietnam 1 1 19 1.0 
Egypt 1 0 18 -0.3 
Georgia 0 1 17 1.1 
Guinea 0 1 12 0.5 
Nicaragua 1 1 12 1.2 
Kenya 1 0 9 -0.2 
Tajikistan 0 1 9 2.2 
Ethiopia 0 1 9 0.3 
Djibouti 0 1 7 0.1 
Bangladesh 1 0 4 -0.5 
Honduras 0 1 4 0.3 
Mongolia 0 1 3 1.1 
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1. Introduction 
The current financial turmoil has been described as the worst crisis to engulf world markets since at 
least World War II. September and October 2008 saw some of the largest falls for decades in 
financial markets across advanced economies, alongside historically unprecedented spikes in 
volatility and risk perceptions. Neither emerging nor developing economies are immune and a 
number of countries have already turned to the IMF for emergency assistance. Despite some very 
recent glimmers of stabilization, fears of a deep global recession are now paramount and substantial 
uncertainty remains. 
In light of the severity and global nature of the current crisis, the present paper seeks to gauge its 
implications for developing countries. This encompasses three main objectives. First, we attempt to 
take stock of recent events and identify the relevant transmission channels through which developing 
countries may be affected by the crisis over both the short- and long-term. Second, we provide a 
comparative assessment (mapping) of the risks facing developing countries based on the latest 
available data. Third, we consider the policy issues for developing countries and the international 
community raised by the crisis. The structure of the paper reflects these three objectives: Section 2 
provides background and an overview of the crisis; Section 3 reviews theoretical and historical 
evidence for crisis transmission challenges; Section 4 presents the mapping analysis; Section 5 
discusses policy implications; and Section 6 concludes. 
The financial crisis is still unfolding. As such, its scope and implications cannot be determined with 
confidence. Moreover, current commentary can become obsolete very quickly. Even so, a number of 
messages from this paper are worth stressing. The main risks to developing countries from the crisis 
do not arise from immediate financial contagion. Rather the medium-term implications of reduced 
access to external capital inflows and a slowdown in global growth will be critical. Lower income 
countries appear to face lower immediate risks due to weaker integration in global markets. 
However, there is substantial diversity among developing countries, in part due to the divergent 
effects of commodity price movements and differential access to potentially stabilising aid inflows. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to clarify the distinction between emerging market economies and 
developing countries (DCs). The former refers to (rapidly) industrializing countries such as those 
found in East and Central Europe, Asia and Latin America. Typically, they are middle income 
countries with relatively well-developed domestic financial markets and access to private global 
capital flows. In contrast, developing countries have less diversified economies, lower average 
incomes and often have limited or no access to global capital markets. Of course this distinction is 
loose; however the point is that the primary focus of this paper is on developing rather than emerging 
market countries. Further distinctions can be made within the set of developing countries, such as 
low income or least developed countries. These finer distinctions are only employed where necessary 
and are highlighted where relevant.  
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2. Background 
The current financial crisis forms part of a period of major stress faced by the financial sectors in 
advanced economies, particularly those with significant operations in the United States and Europe. 
Initially, this was driven by the poor performance of assets associated with domestic real estate 
markets. Central among these were securities backed by ‘sub-prime’ mortgages, many of which 
entered into delinquency or default during 2006 and onwards. 
Initially, the effects of the crisis were contained to financial institutions with heavy exposures to the 
US real estate market. Since September 2008, as the scale of losses became apparent, the crisis has 
entered a more critical phase. Failures of major financial institutions in advanced economies have 
given way to a rapid contraction of inter-bank lending, large equity market losses worldwide and 
substantially heightened risk aversion. Subsequently, large public sector interventions have been 
announced to stabilise markets and recapitalise weakened banking sectors.  
With respect to the causes of the crisis, both longer- and shorter-term factors can be identified. 
Extensive deregulation of the financial sectors in advanced countries since the 1980s has transformed 
banking practices. Retail and commercial banks have entered into investment banking activities, 
enabling traditional banking operations to be funded through international capital markets as well as 
a growing use of highly complex and often weakly transparent financial instruments. According to 
Eichengreen (2008), enhanced competition in financial markets associated with deregulation also has 
stoked an increase in leverage across the financial sector. At the same time, this has occurred in a 
light-touch supervisory framework founded on the widely assumed ability of markets to correctly 
price financial risks.  
Shorter-term factors also are crucial. The stock market crash of 2001 (dotcom crash) prompted the 
US to cut taxes and interest rates in order to dispel recessionary pressures. At the same time, the 
emergence of massive current account (trade) surpluses in China added considerable liquidity to 
international capital markets, much of which flowed to the advanced economies as presumed safe 
havens (in light of the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98). This provoked a rapid credit boom across 
the advanced economies (especially in the US), taking the form of a pronounced real estate bubble. 
This was pricked, however, by significant interest rate hikes from 2005 driven by concerns over 
rising inflation, partly associated with global commodity price rises. 
The extent to which this crisis differs from previous ones is the subject of debate (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2008a). Two points can be highlighted. Firstly, the current situation bears considerable 
resemblance to other post-war banking crises in the industrialized economies given the conjuncture 
of financial deregulation, large capital inflows and rapid increases in real equity markets. Yet, better 
anchoring of inflation and flexible exchange rates may provide some amelioration.  Secondly, 
contrary to the most recent global financial crises, current problems emanate from the advanced 
economies. Indeed, it is well accepted that developing and emerging market economies have been 
enjoying historically favourable macroeconomic conditions in recent years including low external 
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debt ratios and low inflation.1 This is confirmed by Figure A1 (Appendix A), which shows that 
virtually all least developed countries (LDCs) have been able to add to their international reserves 
since 2004, with a median increase equal to 7% of 2007 nominal GDP.2 However, as discussed 
below, macroeconomic stability has been tested more recently by movements in global commodity 
prices (fuel and food). 
3. Transmission channels 
The purpose of this section is to identify the main channels through which the current financial crisis 
is likely to affect developing countries. Three main types of effect can be distinguished: (i) 
immediate financial contagion; (ii) financing effects; and (iii) real sector effects. While the 
discussion in this section is couched largely in theoretical terms, later sections adopt a more 
empirical approach and seek to identify the extent to which certain channels may be more or less 
relevant for individual developing countries. Even so, given that certain effects already are visible in 
developing country markets, supporting evidence of a general nature is presented here. 
3.1. Immediate financial contagion 
A broad definition of financial contagion is when a market disturbance in one country or market 
quickly propagates to other countries and markets.3 While a number of different forms of contagion 
can be distinguished, principal among these is ‘fundamentals-based contagion’ (Calvo and Reinhart, 
1996), which refers to both real and financial sector linkages between countries or markets. Where 
these links are strong (e.g., through trade), asset prices can be expected to move together. In the 
present crisis, a direct means by which DCs may be at risk of contagion is through cross-border 
financial investments. DC investors may be exposed to bad assets such as mortgage-backed 
securities originated in the advanced economies. Also, liquidity problems on international markets 
and heightened levels of uncertainty may lead institutional investors in advanced economies to 
deleverage positions and shift portfolios towards perceived safer investments (flight to quality).4 
Together these effects can be expected to produce a deterioration of domestic and foreign investor 
sentiment, stimulating potentially large sell-offs of tradable overseas assets (equities and bonds) and 
associated price reductions. This tendency is likely to be magnified where accompanied by strong 
fears of negative real sector effects, leading to adjustment of equity valuations and risk perceptions. 
In larger emerging market economies such as the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which 
have relatively deep domestic capital markets and significant volumes of foreign investments, such 
                                                            
1 As one study puts it: “many emerging markets have been running current account surpluses, lending rather than 
borrowing. Instead, a large chunk of money has effectively been recycled to a developing economy that exists within the 
United States’ own borders.” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a: 15) 
2 The same measure for Danida programme countries is 7% of GDP. Many economies in SSA also report favourable 
macroeconomic and external positions, particularly when viewed in historical perspective (for discussion see IMF, 
2008a; Jones, 2007). 
3 This has been widely studied in light of the international effects of the Asian and Russian crises in the late 1990s, not to 
mention numerous historical studies (see Kindleberger, 1995; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008b). 
4 Deleveraging refers to a reduction in investment positions financed through borrowed as compared to equity funds. See 
Schinasi and Smith (1999) for a discussion of portfolio rebalancing and deleveraging as key aspects of financial 
contagion.  
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financial contagion effects already have been visible. Figure A2, for example, plots benchmark 
equity price indices for the G7 economies and emerging markets. Both indices have been severely 
and contemporaneously affected by the recent turmoil. Over the five months from (mid) May to 
October 2008, the emerging markets MSCI index lost 45% of its value versus 35% for the G7 MSCI 
index. For the period illustrated, the correlation coefficient between the two indices is 0.9 (compared 
to 0.56 for 1999-2008), indicating a high degree of equity market co-variance. This demonstrates that 
financial linkages between advanced and emerging economies have been significant and that 
investors may be moving out of emerging market assets due to increased risk aversion and 
recessionary concerns. Put differently, emerging markets are not immune to the recent turmoil.5 
3.2. Financing effects 
A second set of transmission effects refers to the broader financing implications of the crisis for DCs. 
As already noted, an important dimension of the crisis is a shift in investor behaviour and the 
adoption of more conservative investment strategies. Typically these go beyond short-term responses 
and can produce a lasting increase in financing costs for entities located overseas. Eichengreen and 
Rose (1998), among others, have noted that in ‘good times’ of liquidity surpluses and low real 
interest rates in advanced economies, investors may often seek higher yields in emerging and DC 
markets. However, when conditions change, the motivation to invest in these assets can dissipate 
quickly. This will be more pronounced to the extent that effective yields in advanced economies rise, 
which can occur even if Central Bank or Treasury policy rates remain low. Not only does increased 
risk aversion and uncertainty feed into higher inter-bank and corporate lending rates (as has been 
seen in the present crisis already), but also the significant demand for funds to recapitalise weakened 
financial institutions is likely to raise yields available to investors at home (Ablan and Zuill, 2008).6  
Thus, combined with portfolio rebalancing and deleveraging, a likely outcome of the present crisis is 
a significant reduction in the supply of private capital to less developed countries, both as portfolio 
flows and direct investments.7 Reduced access to (higher costs of) external credit may generate 
financing or repayment difficulties for both companies and public agencies. Equally, a worsening 
balance of payments situation caused by sharp reduction in capital inflows can produce significant 
pressure in foreign exchange markets. To the extent that such problems are material, a debt/banking 
crisis may ensue and multilateral support may be needed in the form of IMF emergency lending. 
This prospect already has become a reality for emerging markets such as Hungary and Ukraine.  
While it is difficult to predict how long financing challenges will last, the duration of the effects of 
the Asian crisis suggest they are unlikely to short-lived. Figure A3, for example, illustrates that total 
net private capital inflows to all emerging and developing countries remained below their 1996 levels 
for the entire period between 1997 and 2006, despite low real interest rates in advanced economies. 
                                                            
5 Many commentators similarly have argued that recent events indicate the weak extent of hypothesised ‘decoupling’ of 
emerging and advanced economies. 
6 The same point also refers to investors from the South, who may face more enticing opportunities in channelling funds 
to advanced economies as compared to other LDCs. 
7 This point is widely noted by commentators, e.g., Eichengreen (2008). 
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Although the present financial problems originated in advanced economies, it is plausible this could 
prolong its impact on DCs. The sheer scale of losses and recapitalization needs of advanced country 
financial institutions may well depress outflows for an extended period. In addition, future regulatory 
changes (see Section 5) may act to entrench the home-bias or risk aversion of investors, further 
reducing the flow of foreign private capital into higher risk overseas markets.8  
A concrete signal of altered financing possibilities for emerging market entities comes from the bond 
spread, which is a measure of the risk premium on emerging market debt or the additional costs of 
financing issuers located in these economies face. As can be seen in Figure A4, which plots the 
benchmark JP Morgan composite emerging market bond index (EMBI), the spread fell relatively 
consistently from 1999-2006. This suggests that following the Asia and Russian crises of 1997/98, an 
increasingly favourable financing environment emerged for emerging markets. Even so, recovery 
from the Asian crisis was slow. The bond spread declined only gradually over the same period at a 
rate of around 80 basis points per annum.9 Starting from mid-2007, however, the index shows a trend 
increase as well as a spike associated with the recent crash in equity prices (Figure A2). 
Consequently, external financing conditions for emerging market firms have worsened dramatically. 
In addition, it might be unwise to expect any quick restoration of low bond spreads, even if financial 
conditions in advanced countries improve over the shorter-term. 
The bond spread is mainly indicative of external financing possibilities (costs). Domestic financing 
opportunities may vary considerably, depending both on the depth of local financial markets and 
access to local savings. Even so, any contraction of the aggregate supply of funds holds implications 
for domestic markets. For example, on account of the crisis, foreign banks may be unwilling to 
extend short- or longer-term credits to banks based in DCs. This may constrain domestic credit 
growth and/or increase competition for domestic savings, leading to a rise in aggregate funding costs. 
A final financing effect, especially pertinent for low income countries (LICs), is a decrease in 
development aid due to fiscal constraints faced by major donors.10 Historical data confirms this 
scenario should be taken seriously. Roodman (2008) calculates that after the Nordic financial crisis 
of 1991, aid from Norway, Sweden and Finland fell by 10%, 17% and 62% respectively (measured 
from peak to trough and adjusted for inflation). Private contributions from individuals and firms also 
may decline significantly. Not only are private philanthropic flows now very sizeable, which may 
have a significant effect in particular areas such as emergency aid and targeted health interventions 
(e.g., HIV/AIDS).11 In addition, the predictability of aid also may fall as advanced countries adjust to 
changing fiscal circumstances; and these effects may not be distributed equally across countries due 
to differences in geo-political importance. Strategically less significant countries, such as some of the 
poorest African countries, may be relatively more exposed to alterations in aid flows.  
                                                            
8 See The Economist (2008a); for a more general discussion of home bias see Lewis (1999). 
9 Based on a regression of the composite index against a time trend, plus dummies for 2001 and 2002. 
10 This possibility has been raised in the United States; Senator Joe Biden recently argued that as a consequence of the 
crisis “… the one thing we might have to slow down is a commitment we made to double foreign assistance.” (vice-
presidential debate, 2 October 2008) 
11 Private aid flows totalled approximately US$34 billion in 2007 (40% greater than US bilateral aid). 
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3.3. Real sector effects 
The transmission of changes in financial or monetary variables to the real sector has been analysed 
extensively by for example Kamin et al. (1998). In the present crisis a key channel for DCs is 
through external trade. A recession across advanced countries, now widely expected due to the scale 
of the financial crisis, would have direct income and growth effects on DCs via reduced demand for 
their exports. Even though South-South trade has grown substantially in recent years, consensus 
predictions are of a slowdown in growth across Asia also as a direct consequence of the financial 
crisis (The Economist, 2008b). Thus, continued growth in emerging markets cannot be expected to 
fully offset reduced demand from the advanced economies. Associated relative price changes may 
exacerbate the effects of a slowdown. Commodity prices typically are pro-cyclical, meaning that a 
(global) economic downturn is likely to bring about significant price declines, particularly in primary 
commodities. These dynamics already have been manifest by recent sharp falls in key commodity 
prices such as crude oil. As of end October 2008, one month futures contracts for Brent crude have 
fallen in price by 50% from highs reached in July of this year. 
A second channel for DCs is the real effects of reduced access to, or higher costs of, credit and 
equity funds. At the domestic level this can contribute to a reduction in aggregate demand on top of 
any decline in exports, with potential knock-on implications for employment. Moreover, reduced 
external inflows of capital are likely to directly affect investment rates. The availability and cost of 
credit is frequently found to be a significant positive correlate of private investment in both 
developed and developing economies. Heightened uncertainty and/or deterioration in asset prices 
also can prompt agents to hold back on investment decisions. Thus, given that equity and bond prices 
already have witnessed considerable volatility and losses in many emerging markets, substantial 
implications for real sector growth cannot be dismissed.12  
The interaction between negative financial and real sector effects has the potential to become self-
reinforcing. This occurs where financial crisis leads to tough credit conditions and lower aggregate 
demand, which in turn feeds into reduced profitability and potential repayment difficulties for firms, 
thereby further worsening banks’ loan portfolios. Additionally, deteriorating income and 
employment conditions in the advanced countries can spill-over into lower remittances from migrant 
workers. This can add to the uncertainty facing economic agents in DCs and feed into deeper 
contractions in aggregate demand, including investment. The poor typically are hit hardest by 
negative economic shocks due to the precarious nature of their income sources and their lack of 
access to savings or credit. Thus, any effect of the crisis on remittances is particularly relevant. It is 
the poorest segments of the population who are often more dependent on these inflows. 
Finally, the combination of financing and real sector challenges can place significant strains on 
government finances. Slower growth typically leads to a reduction in tax revenue growth while at the 
same time prompting demands for increased government spending, particularly on social 
                                                            
12 In Nigeria, for example, domestic banks have been lending heavily against a bullish stock market. However, to date 
equity markets have lost around over 30% of their value since March 2000. Consequently, both wealth effects and higher 
repayment burdens may undermine future investment rates. 
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programmes and demand-stimulating investments.  This pressure may be more extreme for lower 
income countries that rely heavily on commodity exports and have very narrow tax bases. Also, 
external and domestic financial pressures can increase government borrowing costs making it more 
difficult to finance budget shortfalls. These challenges suggest a heightened need for prudent and 
credible macroeconomic and fiscal policies, a discussion taken up in Section 5. 
4. Mapping the implications for developing countries 
4.1. Methodology 
Thus far our analysis has remained at a generic level. Although some evidence for the effects of the 
crisis on developing countries has been presented, much of this refers to (middle income) emerging 
market economies and may be less applicable to lower income economies. Moreover, recent shifts in 
global economic conditions have led to significant divergences between developing economies in 
terms of their macroeconomic circumstances (IMF, 2008b). This has arisen principally from the 
divergent inflationary and terms of trade effects of movements in global commodity prices, which 
have been pronounced since 2005. Differing conditions are evident as much within as between 
developing country regions and income groups. As a result, the implications of the financial crisis 
need to be understood in the context of other recent economic changes (dubbed a ‘triple crisis’ of 
fuel, food and finance).  
Case studies based on detailed understanding of local institutional circumstances and historical 
experiences are indispensible for deriving meaningful policy advice. However, in light of the 
comparative intentions of this paper, a broader approach is taken. The objective is to try and identify 
developing countries that may be particularly affected by recent global financial events. This is 
undertaken through the construction and analysis of a parsimonious set of indicators that seek to 
capture both the relevance of recent global changes for economic developments (conditions) at the 
country-level, as well as pertinent dimensions of economic vulnerability. The approach is motivated 
by the extensive literature on financial crisis early warning systems (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2000; 
Hawkins and Klau, 2000).  
There are four distinctive aspects of the method used here. First is the focus on the relevance of the 
crisis. This reflects the point that the origins of the first-round effects of the crisis are external to 
developing economies such that countries with limited financial or real sector linkages to external 
markets may face limited impacts compared to those that are deeply integrated with global markets. 
Second, the concept of vulnerability is not restricted to purely financial or banking system soundness 
indicators. Rather, broader macroeconomic conditions are included due to the importance of 
inflationary and current account pressures in some countries. Third, the scope of analysis is not 
limited to larger emerging market countries with comparatively deep domestic capital markets. 
Rather, attention is given to developing countries and low income economies in particular. Finally, 
8 
 
based on the constructed indicators, very recent ‘crisis event’ data taken from requests for IMF 
assistance and ratings agency downgrades are used to predict the probability of crisis.13 
Before proceeding, a few technical issues merit attention. The core sample of countries selected for 
the comparative mapping analysis is set out in Appendix B. These are developing countries classified 
as IDA-eligible borrowers (International Development Association of the World Bank), the vast 
majority of which are also Less Developed Countries according to the United Nations’ definition. 
Consequently, high and upper-medium income countries are eliminated. At the same time, in order 
to cover all Danida programme countries, Egypt is included in the set despite not being an IDA-
eligible borrower. Lastly, a small number of specific outliers such as Zimbabwe and Vanuatu are 
excluded in order to maintain coherency.  
As discussed further below, the analysis starts by identifying a set of variables that capture the 
relevance and vulnerability of countries to the current crisis. To facilitate comparison across 
variables, they are then transformed into standardized indicators. This is undertaken in usual fashion 
by subtracting each country observation from the group mean and dividing by the group standard 
deviation, thereby creating a dimensionless variable with mean zero and standard deviation of one.14 
In addition, aggregate indicators are created by calculating simple averages across individual 
indicators. These aggregate indicators are standardized in the same way, although typically this 
involves very minor adjustments to actual values.  
We highlight two important aspects of the indicators. First, they are constructed in a consistent 
fashion such that high values are always a cause for greater concern. With respect to international 
reserves, for example (see further below), a high indicator value indicates a low reserves to GDP 
ratio. Secondly, the indicators only capture relative rather than absolute differences between 
countries in the selected set. Specific indicator values do not map into estimated critical thresholds 
associated with any economic crisis.  
Some limitations of the approach also can be noted. Although guided by relevant literature, the 
choice of indicators here is somewhat subjective. It is also constrained by the availability of recent 
data, which is most important in the present circumstances. For example, the latest data on fiscal 
pressures, such as the budget deficit, is not easily available for the full range of selected countries. 
The same is true for credit expansion and specific financial depth variables. Finally, the crisis event 
data (see below) is only indicative of a high risk of crisis as perceived by financial markets; it is not 
an objective measure. As such, the overall approach should be seen as a starting point rather than an 
end in itself. However, it provides a transparent and rigorous means to differentiate between 
countries along different dimensions and therefore allows specific countries to be flagged. 
                                                            
13 The novelty here is not the prediction of crisis per se, but rather the use of most recent event data. As such this 
approach goes some way to address the critique that each crisis is unique. 
14 The group here is the core sample described in Appendix B. 
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4.2. Choice of indicators 
Concerning the relevance of different transmission channels for individual DCs, there is widespread 
agreement that extensive and immediate financial contagion is likely to be limited (Oxford 
Analytica, 2008). Both due to regulatory controls and the limited sophistication of many DC 
financial sectors, (own-account) investments in international securities and capital market 
instruments are extremely small, if not non-existent. In turn, minimal direct exposure to collapsed 
asset prices in advanced economies significantly reduces the risks of an immediate banking crisis. At 
the same time, while foreign banks do have considerable operations in DCs, these operate principally 
as subsidiaries and thereby must meet capital adequacy requirements at the domestic level.15 
It is appropriate, therefore, to focus attention on transmission channels which hold medium- and 
longer-term implications for DCs. Obvious candidates here are the extent to which economies are 
reliant on (net) external capital inflows, particularly inflows from private entities such as portfolio 
investment, foreign direct investment and remittances. The prospect of a decline or even reversal in 
such flows to DCs is a factor with historical pedigree and is widely cited as likely given recent 
developments (see above). Even for SSA, previously seen as marginalised from global private capital 
flows, both portfolio direct investment and remittance flows have surged in recent years (IMF, 
2008a). Using latest available data, the volume of each of these different flows relative to GDP 
therefore is used as a proxy for their economic importance. In turn, this provides an indicator of the 
relevance of changes in the behaviour of such flows at the country-level.16 An additional dimension 
is the extent of reliance on export income. Where this is comparatively large, the effects of a 
slowdown in export demand, as well as knock-on impacts on other domestic sectors and changes in 
relative prices may be more acute. Consequently, an additional ‘crisis relevance’ indicator is the 
value of exports to GDP. Taken together, these four components capture the importance of external 
financing and trade linkages that may act as transmission channels for the crisis.  
Numerous measures of economic, fiscal and financial vulnerability have been proposed in the 
literature (e.g., Hawkins and Klau, 2000; Mulder and Bussiere, 1999). Many of these attend to 
specific aspects of the financial sector such as non-performing banking sector assets and changes in 
the supply of credit, as well as alterations in credit ratings. Typically this kind of data is only 
available in a timely fashion for larger emerging market countries. For low income countries, which 
dominate the analytical sample here, cruder measures must be adopted. To reflect the importance of 
recent inflationary and current account pressures associated with fuel and food price commodity 
rises, four macroeconomic vulnerability measures are used. They capture the level of observed 
pressures in domestic prices and the current account, as well as recent changes in these two 
variables. Movements in the current account are critical because they capture the combined effects of 
changes in the terms of trade as well as net external financing. Indeed, it is widely recognised that 
                                                            
15 Foreign-owned banks operating in DCs typically are retail and commercial banks (e.g., Barclays, Stanbic, Citigroup) 
rather than investment-only banking operations. As such, they are more robust to the current crisis given they have larger 
retail financing bases. 
16 Further technical details of all indicators and their underlying data sources are given in Appendix C. 
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countries with large current account deficits and a high reliance on private capital inflows (to finance 
this deficit) may be particularly badly affected by the crisis.17 
A further set of external financial vulnerability indicators are constructed, reflecting the health of 
countries’ external balances both in terms of liabilities (debt obligations) and assets (reserves). These 
variables are standard components of financial crisis early warning systems. Consolidated net foreign 
liabilities to BIS banks, including debt securities, is calculated as a percentage of GDP in order to 
gauge the relative size of external payment obligations and vulnerability to a sharp withdrawal of 
funding and/or external deposits. The stock of debt to official multilateral creditors (relative to GDP) 
also indicates the extent of the external debt burden as well as the accumulation of past 
vulnerabilities. Finally, both the current stock and recent changes in international reserves provide 
signals of macroeconomic pressures.18,19 
The above indicators are supplemented by additional variables (also detailed in Appendix C) such as 
net aid to GDP, index scores of economic and overall state fragility and measures of the adequacy of 
country policy frameworks based on World Bank CPIA scores. These provide further information to 
assess the ability of individual countries to withstand changes in external conditions and implement 
prudent policy responses.  
4.3. Mapping results 
This sub-section presents and discusses the main results of the mapping analysis. Given the number 
of dimensions covered by the individual indicators, it is helpful to explore the aggregate indicators 
first.20 Table 1 shows pair wise correlations for these aggregate indicators and additional variables of 
interest, indicating the extent to which different measures are related and, if so, in which direction. A 
key finding is that the crisis-relevance indicator is associated with other variables in intuitively 
plausible ways, thereby lending support to the methodology. Given this indicator reflects de facto 
openness to external trade and financial flows, it is no surprise that it is associated positively with 
real GDP per capita and negatively with both aid flows and the state failure score (for which higher 
values mean more failure). In other words, and as found in many other studies, successful integration 
in global markets tends to be associated with better socio-economic performance and a lower 
reliance on official assistance.  
                                                            
17 The current account measure used here is not restricted to trade in goods; therefore, it accounts for current income 
transfers such as (net) development aid and remittance inflows. 
18 The suitability of these macroeconomic and financial vulnerability indicators is confirmed elsewhere. For example, the 
World Bank states: “The deterioration in external positions over the past year has left many developing countries more 
vulnerable to external shocks. Countries with heavy external financing needs are most vulnerable, particularly in cases 
where private debt inflows into the banking sector have fuelled rapid expansion in domestic credit and raised inflationary 
pressures.” (World Bank, 2008a: 3). 
19 The IMF’s recent analysis of conditions facing sub-Saharan Africa makes similar points: “There are unprecedented 
risks to the global economic outlook, and the resilience of growth and macroeconomic stability in the [African] continent 
is being put to a test. ... Those countries facing inflationary import price shocks, declines in their terms of trade, and 
lower remittances and private capital inflows face an especially acute challenge; a shortfall in aid would be a further 
difficult blow. More generally, recent volatility underscores the lesson that countries enjoying favourable circumstances 
should build an adequate external reserve cushion.” (IMF, 2008c: 2) 
20 Tables B1 and B2 (Appendix B) present results for individual countries across the aggregated indicators. More detailed 
country tables are available from the authors on request. 
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Table 1: Pair wise correlations for aggregate indicators 
  Crisis-
relevance 
Vulnerability 
  Macro Financial 
Crisis-relevance - 0.111 -0.241* 
Macro vulnerability 0.111 - 0.179 
Financial vulnerability -0.241* 0.179 - 
GDP per capita 0.474* 0.073 -0.385* 
ODA/GDP -0.212* 0.114 0.123 
State failure score -0.315* -0.246* 0.301* 
Policy index 0.113 -0.035 -0.304* 
Obs. = 65; * significant at 10% level (or below) 
Note: columns give Pearson correlation coefficients; variables are as described 
in Appendix C. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 2: Average indicator scores by country groupings 
  LDC group Danida programme group 
Indicator No Yes prob. /a No Yes prob. /a 
Crisis-relevance 0.60 -0.40 0.00** 0.10 -0.31 0.07+ 
Macro vulnerability 0.21 -0.14 0.16 0.03 -0.09 0.64 
Financial vulnerability -0.11 0.07 0.45 0.11 -0.34 0.08+ 
Overall 0.39 -0.26 0.01* 0.14 -0.42 0.07+ 
Number of obs. 26 39 65 49 16 65 
Significant at + 10%, * 5%, ** 1%  levels 
Note: a. gives the (2-tail) probability of the t-statistic calculated from the difference between the 
group averages (using Welch correction); variables and groups are as described in 
Appendix C; equal weights applied. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
The financial vulnerability indicator tells a similar story; however, here the association is reversed. 
Broadly speaking, countries with more robust external financial positions are more successfully 
integrated in global markets, are relatively richer and have better economic policy frameworks. In 
other words, their economic success is characterised by the combination of integration and sound 
financial management. The macro vulnerability indicator provides a further dimension to the 
analysis. Not only is it uncorrelated with both other aggregate indicators, meaning it is providing 
new information, it also is negatively associated with state failure. This is understandable when one 
notes that many of the most ‘failed’ states are low income, resource-rich primary commodity 
exporters. These have been least adversely affected by recent global commodity price developments 
and, therefore, have been in a better position to contain their inflationary and current account effects. 
Thus, as desired, the macro vulnerability appears to reflect pressures in precisely these areas. 
Before identifying specific countries that may be cause for concern, it is useful to investigate 
differences in indicators across country sub-groups. One classification, employed in Table 2, is based 
on Least Developed Country (LDC) and Danida programme status. As shown by the crisis-relevance 
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scores, both LDCs and Danida programme countries are relatively less dependent on external flows 
compared to their non-LDC, IDA-eligible peers. However, while for LDCs there is no significant 
difference as regards macro or financial vulnerability, Danida programme countries show 
significantly lower financial vulnerability scores. This may reflect Danida’s focus on relatively stable 
and non-failed developing countries, many of which have been able to benefit from extensive debt 
relief. Taking the (overall) average across the three scores, members of these sub-groups appear 
comparatively less at risk from the negative transmission effects of the current crisis. This is an 
encouraging result in the sense that LDCs are characterised by higher levels of poverty and lower 
government capacity and, therefore, may be less capable of addressing negative effects on their own. 
Despite the above, group averages can hide significant variation. All countries within these groups 
do not face similar conditions. Taking the LDC and non-LDC groups separately, Figure 1 plots each 
country’s crisis-relevance score against its overall vulnerability score (the average of the macro and 
financial indicators). This confirms that only a small number of LDC countries combine high crisis-
relevance and high-vulnerability scores (i.e., few countries are located in the top right quadrant of the 
left-hand panel). The plot also highlights a number of particularly vulnerable countries, as well as 
countries for whom the crisis may be less significant. Among the latter group Bhutan stands out as a 
prime example, characterised as it is by very few linkages to external markets. At the same time, 
there are a number of commodity exporters, such as Angola, Azerbaijan and Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), for whom the current crisis appears relevant but who also show reasonably low vulnerability 
scores which can be traced to low official external debt stocks and strong current account positions. 
Figure 1: Scatter plot of crisis-relevance and vulnerability scores, by country 
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The most vulnerable countries are located in the top half of each figure, with those located towards 
the right-hand side also exhibiting higher crisis-relevance scores. Among these, a number of fragile 
states can be found, namely: Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tajikistan.21 A pertinent threat for these countries over the medium-
term is that negative effects arising from the present crisis act to exacerbate existing vulnerabilities 
and tensions. Although the crisis may be less relevant for some due to their weaker external linkages 
(e.g., Burundi), the combination of crisis-vulnerability and high fragility suggests particularly 
attention and, if necessary, international support should be given to this group.22 
4.4. Watch list countries 
The previous discussion introduces a difficulty – how should scores along different dimensions be 
weighted? A simple average of the relevance and vulnerability measures (Table 2) may be less useful 
than some form of weighted combination. As a result, an additional analytical step is taken which 
involves using the aggregate indicators, alongside a small number of additional variables, to predict 
the likelihood of a financial crisis.23 If the latter were known with certainty, then the current exercise 
would be futile. However, we do have some indications of countries that are already facing financial 
difficulties due to recent events. This includes countries currently in talks with the IMF for 
emergency assistance (e.g., Iceland, Hungary), and countries that have received negative outlooks or 
downgraded credit ratings by major ratings agencies (Moody’s, Fitch, Standard & Poor’s) in recent 
months. Defining these countries as those facing a current ‘crisis event’, this provides a basis to 
model the likelihood of a crisis using the aggregate indicators and other variables as predictors. This 
amounts to a (regression-based) weighting exercise whereby the set of explanatory variables are 
combined in a linear vector to give individual country scores (fitted probabilities). 
Taking the existence of a crisis event as the dependent variable, Table 3 gives the results for two 
binomial probit models. Considering that the number of observed crisis event countries is small and 
that ratings agencies typically only cover advanced and emerging markets, the regressions are based 
on an expanded sample comprising all countries for which data is available (N=161). The two 
specifications (Models I and II) differ only by their ODA variable. As one can see from Model II, 
ODA as a percent of GDP has a large negative coefficient. However, this may reflect a selection bias 
arising from the range of countries covered by ratings agencies; thus, ODA per capita is used in 
Model I as an alternative. Overall, the two models have a good fit – correctly predicting 70% of 
observed crisis events on average (also pseudo R-squares are over 40%). Estimated coefficients on 
the explanatory variables are similar across the models and are in the expected directions. For 
example, higher state fragility is positively associated with a crisis event. Importantly, each of the 
aggregate indicators is significant at the 10% level (at least), confirming their predictive value and 
                                                            
21 The threshold here is a score of 88 or above on the ‘state fragility’ variable described in Appendix C. 
22 In this regard it is notable that Pakistan has requested emergency support from the IMF; as the IMF press release puts 
it: “The Pakistani authorities have requested discussions with the IMF on an economic program supported by financial 
assistance from the Fund to meet the balance of payments difficulties the country is experiencing as a result of high food 
and fuel prices and the global financial crisis.” (October 22, 2008; 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr08254.htm) 
23 This approach also provides a means to verify the contemporary validity of the aggregate indicators. 
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individual distinctiveness. Macro vulnerability, however, has a larger coefficient, indicating it has a 
higher weighting relative to the other aggregate indicators.  
Table 3: Probit model for financial crisis based on ratings agency outlooks 
Dependent variable: 
crisis event 
Model I Model II 
coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. 
Crisis-relevance 0.29* (0.13) 0.28* (0.14) 
Financial vulnerability 0.33+ (0.20) 0.49* (0.23) 
Macro vulnerability 1.12** (0.26) 1.17** (0.29) 
Fragile state index 0.52* (0.27) 0.56* (0.28) 
ODA per capita -0.50 (0.34) - - 
ODA / GDP - - -2.11* (1.03) 
Population (log.) 0.18 (0.11) 0.17+ (0.10) 
Income group (LIC) -2.41** (0.87) -1.48 (1.04) 
Income group (LMC) -1.12 (0.75) -0.79 (0.80) 
Income group (UMC) 0.58 (0.51) 0.56 (0.58) 
Constant -1.43** (0.50) -2.34** (0.70) 
N 161 161 
Pseudo R-square 0.41 0.45 
Chi-square 55.5 40.7 
AIC 95.7 90.2 
Significant at + 10%, * 5%, ** 1%  levels 
Notes: all variables and data sources are as discussed in the text; all variables excluding 
population (log.) and income group (dummies) are stated in standardized form. 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
The average of the fitted values from the two models is used to measure the probability that each 
country will face a crisis. Focussing on the core sample of developing countries only, Figure 2 plots 
this probability against the un-weighted average of the aggregate indexes (only selected economies 
shown). From this a watch list of countries can be constructed, constituted by countries that score 
comparatively highly on both measures relative to other countries in the core sample. The cut-off 
points are shown in the figure and the selected countries also are listed in Table 4, along with their 
average crisis probabilities, overall and aggregate indicator scores.24 The watch list includes many 
countries that have been identified elsewhere as a focus for concern. Pakistan, for example, already 
has sought emergency assistance from the IMF. Others, such as Sri Lanka, Guinea and the Maldives 
(among others), appear in fiscal vulnerability categorizations such as those undertaken by the World 
Bank (2008b: Figure 1) and IMF  (2008b: Table 6), which focus on vulnerability to rising fuel and 
food prices. The reappearance of these countries here testifies to the robustness of the mapping 
methodology. 
                                                            
24 For each variable the cut-off point is the median plus 15% of the standard deviation. Thus, a watchlist country falls 
above this threshold for both the crisis probability measure and the aggregate indicator average. Note that the underlying 
distributions refer only to the core sample of developing countries. 
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Figure 2: Scatter plot of crisis probability and overall indicator  
average for selected countries 
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Table 4: Indicator scores and measures for watch list countries  
Crisis Indicator
prob. /a average /b Macro Financial ODA/GDP Policy
Mongolia 3% 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.0 6.4 3.3
Honduras 4% 0.3 0.7 0.3 -0.6 5.5 3.8
Djibouti 7% 0.1 0.2 1.5 -1.6 15.2 3.0
Ethiopia 9% 0.3 -0.9 1.1 0.4 12.8 3.5
Tajikistan 9% 2.2 2.3 0.9 0.7 8.5 4.0
Nicaragua 12% 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.1 13.9 4.0
Guinea 12% 0.5 -0.7 0.9 0.7 5.8 3.3
Georgia 17% 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.1 4.6 4.5
Vietnam 19% 1.0 0.8 1.2 -0.3 3.0 4.5
Burundi 21% 1.2 -1.5 1.5 2.0 45.1 3.5
Grenada 24% 1.9 0.9 1.2 1.2 4.8 3.0
Sudan 27% 0.7 -0.2 0.3 1.1 5.7 3.3
Moldova 29% 1.4 1.9 1.1 -0.6 6.7 4.0
Pakistan 36% 0.7 -0.7 0.4 1.6 1.7 3.5
Sri Lanka 58% 0.9 -0.2 1.0 0.7 2.8 2.8
Maldives 80% 2.2 0.1 2.8 0.9 4.2 2.8
Average 23% 1.0 0.4 1.1 0.4 9.2 3.5
VulnerabilityCrisis-
relevance
 
Note: a. based on probit regressions (Table 3); b. standardized average of relevance and vulnerability 
indicators; variables and watchlist countries as described in the text and Appendix C. 
Source: authors’ calculations from relevant data sources (see Appendix C). 
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The table also indicates there is substantial diversity among these countries. The crisis probabilities, 
for example, range from 3% to 80% a finding partly explained by the negative impact of low income 
status and/or higher aid inflows on the probability of crisis. Indeed, the majority of developing 
countries have a crisis probability lower than 1% and less than a fifth of the LDC sub-group have a 
probability greater than 5%. Differences across the aggregate index scores point to further sources of 
diversity. Nicaragua and Vietnam show comparatively low financial vulnerability scores, reflecting 
their more robust international reserves and external debt positions. Even so, their macroeconomic 
environments appear to have deteriorated over the past year, which may generate substantial 
difficulties in formulating appropriate monetary and fiscal responses to further effects from the 
current crisis. In contrast, Pakistan and Sudan demonstrate considerable external financial 
vulnerabilities but less weakness on the macro side. Even so, it is notable that the average macro 
vulnerability score is considerably higher than the averages for the other indexes for watch list 
countries. This underlines the greater weight attributed to this dimension in the exercise.  
The diversity of the challenges facing watch list countries can be further unpacked by examining the 
constituent elements of the underlying macro and financial vulnerability indicators. As shown in 
Figure 3, this reinforces the specificity of country circumstances and policy pressures.25 Again, a few 
comparisons are illustrative. The high macro vulnerability of the Maldives derives principally from a 
weak and rapidly deteriorating current account position. Burundi’s position on the watch list would 
seem to be driven largely by high external debt stocks which may generate repayment difficulties. 
For both Vietnam and Sri Lanka, however, the primary challenge seems to refer to containment of 
inflationary pressures. 
Referring back to Table 4, it also is useful to note significant differences between countries in terms 
of the aid and policy variables. Where aid levels are relatively high (>5% GDP), it is reasonable to 
conclude that any material reduction in such inflows over the medium-term could exacerbate 
observed vulnerabilities and economic difficulties. Nicaragua is a germane example – sustained 
inflows of aid are likely to be crucial to support its current account deficit and help smooth any 
adjustment from a possible loss of remittances. Additionally, the macroeconomic and fiscal policy 
environment varies from the comparatively robust positions of Vietnam and Georgia (score 4.5) to 
fragility in the Maldives and Sri Lanka.26 One should also note that due to the rapidly evolving 
nature of the situation as well as data weaknesses, the present exercise is not comprehensive. For 
example, the latest reports from Vietnam suggest a slowing in inflation compared to the first half of 
the current year. Fiscal balance data, which is not available on a comprehensive basis, also can be 
used to provide further insights. Taking the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB, 2008) estimates for 
2007, Tajikistan, the Maldives and Pakistan also exhibit comparatively high and deteriorating 
government budget deficits. This serves only to confirm their presence on the watch list. 
                                                            
25 The same figures are provided for Danida programme countries in Appendix A. 
26 The CPIA score was not included in the probit analysis as these scores are only available for IDA countries. 
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Figure 3: Macro and financial vulnerability components for watch list countries 
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5. Policy issues and challenges 
This section discusses the policy issues and challenges for developing countries arising from the 
current financial crisis. Events are evolving at a rapid pace such that the depth, scope and long-term 
implications are very difficult to envisage. Even so, three broad policy areas can be distinguished and 
are treated in turn. The first is domestic responses by developing countries to the effects of the crisis 
over the short- and medium-terms. Second, current policy challenges for the international community 
as regards their relations with developing countries are given attention. Finally, the outlines of some 
of the broader longer-term issues will be reviewed. 
5.1. Country-level responses 
Compared to more advanced economies, domestic policy responses in developing countries are 
constrained by a number of factors. At a general level, high-levels of dollarization and weak 
financial development often render standard monetary policy tools, such as adjustment of policy 
interest rates, weak instruments to achieve price stability. Perhaps more critical in the current 
context, inflationary pressures associated with international commodity price movements have been 
particularly acute in developing economies. This reflects the high share of basic commodities in 
household budgets, as well as a lack of domestic substitutes to key commodity imports. Where these 
pressures have been significant (as indicated by the macro indicator; see Section 4), monetary and 
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fiscal policy flexibility already is likely to have been constricted before transmission effects from the 
financial crisis are taken into account.27 
Given the above, standard responses to externally-generated economic difficulties such as 
expansionary fiscal or monetary policy may be neither feasible nor appropriate. Particularly in 
countries with more advanced financial sectors (e.g., Vietnam), the loosening of monetary policy 
could further undermine foreign private capital inflows (prompt outflows) and/or stoke inflation. As 
a result, the IMF’s (2008b: 2) blunt appraisal that “[developing] counties face difficult choices as 
they seek to facilitate the inevitable adjustment in their economies” remains valid. This is likely to be 
the case, although to a lesser extent, even if commodity prices continue their current downward trend 
and stabilise at significantly lower levels than the peaks witnessed in 2007/08. Not only does this 
reflect the current consensus that real commodity prices will not return to their pre-boom levels; 
rather, both the accumulated fiscal effects of the commodity price boom, commodity price 
uncertainty and the possibility of reduced exports and private capital inflows may render 
expansionary policy responses unsustainable. 
Consequently, prudent and credible macroeconomic and fiscal policies are central. In concrete terms, 
some general ‘good practice’ principles can be suggested; however, their suitability in any specific 
case must be examined in light of country circumstances. Firstly, pass-through of international prices 
to domestic markets must be allowed. Secondly, improved targeting of measures to protect specific 
sub-groups such as the poorest from adjustment or price shocks must be given priority over 
generalised schemes. The latter not only are expensive but also typically favour the already well-off. 
Thirdly, (downward) exchange rate flexibility can be a critical instrument to contain mounting 
external pressures. However, also as noted by IMF (2008b), many DC governments have been 
unwilling to allow real depreciation, at least in part because of the effects on import prices and the 
cost of servicing foreign currency liabilities. While this may be attractive in the short-term, structural 
imbalances and loss of export competitiveness particularly vis-à-vis larger emerging market 
economies that are currently under currency pressures (e.g., South Africa, South Korea) should not 
be dismissed. Fourthly, enhanced supervision of financial institutions and careful monitoring of 
external capital flows is advisable. In some instances, countries have found temporary controls on 
short-term external capital flows to be a helpful means to reduce destabilising swings.  
To summarise, the current crisis does not represent a fundamentally new set of circumstances for the 
majority of developing countries. However, it is likely to aggravate pre-existing challenges, 
including gaining admission to export markets, attracting external investment financing and ensuring 
access to domestic sources of capital on reasonable terms. As such, a general worsening of growth 
prospects for developing countries is to be expected, especially for those that are more reliant on 
external linkages. One should not ignore that the combination of lower (export) growth, reduced 
investment inflows and tighter local credit conditions plausibly could evolve into local financial 
                                                            
27 The IMF (2008b), for example, estimates that the median fiscal cost of policy measures adopted to ameliorate food and 
fuel price amounts to 0.7 percentage points of GDP in developing countries (as of September 2008). 
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sector difficulties.28 To date these are among the principal concerns raised by some of the larger 
developing countries, such as China and India, and thus reinforce the need for careful financial sector 
monitoring and prudent fiscal policies over the medium-term. 
5.2. International responses 
The primary focus of the international community has been on advanced economies and the adoption 
of measures to stabilise domestic financial sectors (see Section 2). However, contagion effects are 
now evident in larger emerging market economies, among which some may not have sufficient 
domestic resources to provide credible lender-of-last resort and/or balance of payments support. 
Thus, in face of large external outflows and currency pressures, recourse to multilateral facilities 
such as the IMF is increasingly realistic for a substantial number of governments. So far, there 
appears to be a clear willingness on the part of advanced economies and the IMF to provide 
emergency concessional lending to affected countries where necessary. As at end October 2008, the 
IMF has established a short-term liquidity facility to provide quick-disbursing funds for (eligible) 
countries facing temporary liquidity problems in global markets. The World Bank also has created a 
$1.2 billion rapid financing facility to assist country adjustment. There is no doubt that this stance 
should be maintained and extended. Importantly, however, coordinated efforts should be given 
priority as the scale of the current crisis has the potential to dwarf even the $250 billion resources 
available to the IMF on its own. 
As discussed above, many lower income countries do not face material risks of financial contagion 
due to the limited role of short-term external private capital flows. Even so, this does not mean they 
should be neglected by the international community. For many DCs, aid inflows are essential to 
maintain macroeconomic stability and, in the event of reduced private inflows such as remittances, 
are likely to become even more important. It is therefore critical that official aid commitments are 
honoured and that aid budgets are not dramatically cut. Efforts should also be ensured to reinforce 
aid predictability. In this regard it is encouraging that calls to maintain aid flows have been made in 
numerous international fora.29 However, corresponding actions are required as is the willingness of 
multilateral institutions to continue to engage and support the poorest countries. 
5.3. Long-term challenges 
Various long-term policy challenges are likely to emerge in the wake of the current crisis. Perhaps 
most prominent of these is the question of financial regulation. A forceful critique of the present 
global financial system is that it has become increasingly pro-cyclical in nature. Persuad (2008; 
                                                            
28 As the Governor of the Bank of Uganda recently put it: “Although direct exposure to crisis-related debt is very limited, 
vulnerabilities in sub-Saharan financial markets may become more exposed. As a result, perceived risks of a protracted 
US downturn, or even recession, and what that would mean for Africa’s … growth momentum may be intensified.” 
(Tumusiime-Mutebile, 24 September 2008). 
29 For example, the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund (the Development 
Committee) recently stated that: “Poorer countries, with their limited sources of fiscal revenue, will be especially 
dependent on timely and predictable flows of Official Development Assistance (ODA). In this regard, we emphasized the 
enhanced importance, in the current context, of donors meeting their ODA commitments.” (Development Committee 
Communiqué, 12 October 2008, Washington DC). 
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2000), for example, argues that over at least the last decade, the rise of market as opposed to 
traditional bank finance, as well as the move to self-regulation based on calculations of asset-specific 
and market-priced risks, has acted to heighten the instability of national and global financial systems. 
This has occurred through a reduction of systemic liquidity, which refers to the liquidity available 
under stressed conditions where decisions to sell/buy assets are not driven by valuations or attributes 
of particular assets, but rather by the behaviour of other market participants (Laganá et al., 2006). 
Adrian and Shin (2007) note that standard models of contagion based on sequential defaults are no 
longer meaningful in modern financial markets where financial institutions actively manage their 
balance sheets based on observed market prices and volatilities (as per regulatory standards). Rather, 
due to the complexity of inter-linkages between market institutions, price declines may be sufficient 
to set in motion a self-reinforcing dynamic of asset sell-offs, deleveraging and contagion. With 
global financial markets, this can infect emerging and developing markets, exposing them to large 
inflows of capital in periods of low market volatility followed by rapid reversals as conditions 
deteriorate. Even the Bank of England (2008) notes that financial markets have mispriced risks and 
failed to account for systemic factors. 
As a consequence of these insights, new regulatory approaches are being advocated. These include 
applying different regulatory regimes to market participants according to the duration of their 
funding base, thereby creating greater incentives for some actors to undertake longer-term (stable) 
asset investments both at home and overseas. Contra-cyclical capital adequacy regulations that 
impose tougher requirements during ‘good’ periods of rapid leverage growth have been espoused. 
Goodhart (2008), among others, argues that Central Banks should give greater priority to the overall 
stability of the financial system rather than on price stability alone. The point here is that increased 
transparency, use of ‘best practices’ and regulatory coordination, while important in themselves, may 
not be sufficient to address the fundamental failures of modern financial markets. As is evident from 
the current crisis, how finance is regulated in the developed world is hardly trivial for developing 
countries. 
Linked to the above is a debate over the international financial architecture. This refers to the roles 
and objectives of international financial institutions such as the IMF. Prior to recent events, some 
argued that these institutions had become largely redundant in light of the widespread adoption of 
flexible exchange rates and open capital accounts alongside the significant expansion of global 
capital flows. However, today’s landscape is quite different. Not only has the financial turmoil 
exposed the need for financial coordination and lender-of-last resort capacities at the supra-national 
level, but it also has brought into question the dominant role of the dollar as a de facto global reserve 
currency. With the rise of sovereign wealth funds and large reserve assets held outside of the 
advanced economies (e.g. China), there are increasingly loud calls to make concerted moves to 
reduce the dependence of the global financial system on the vagaries of the American economy and 
its national currency (Reuters, 2008; Ocampo, 2007). One option would be to reinforce and 
restructure the IMF as a reserve currency institution. 
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A final debate concerns the criticisms of globalization and capitalism that are likely to intensify in 
response to the crisis. Wade (2008), for example, argues the current crisis may represent a 
fundamental regime-shift away from Anglo-American capitalism and its ‘neoliberal’ underpinnings. 
Although not to be dismissed, these viewpoints should be read with caution. Prior to the crisis, 
numerous scholars questioned the argument that globalization generates unconditional benefits for 
developing countries (Andersen and Tarp, 2003). Recent events underline the need for a careful 
examination of the risk-reward trade-offs associated with extensive deregulation and external 
economic integration for DCs. However, critiques of globalization should not be taken too far. 
Global integration and competitive markets have been fundamental components of East Asian 
economic successes. Also, financial markets must be understood as having distinctive weaknesses 
and systemic features. Even so, the current crisis does serve to illustrate the increasingly complex, 
inter-connected and rapidly shifting nature of global markets. What this means for developing 
countries’ growth strategies requires further analysis; and it is not a question that should be 
dismissed.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed the risks and implications of the financial crisis for developing countries. It 
bears repeating that the present situation continues to evolve rapidly and that there is no prospect of a 
rapid return to stable market conditions. The threat of further financial turmoil and/or a deep global 
recession (or depression) is significant. A worst case scenario of sequential sovereign default by 
advanced country governments cannot be ruled-out. In light of such uncertainty, the analysis of this 
paper can only be seen as provisional and exploratory. 
Ten main messages can be summarised: 
i. The principal effects of the crisis for developing countries do not arise from 
immediate financial contagion such as exposure to sub-prime assets in advanced 
economies. Medium- and long-term channels, namely reduced access to (private) 
external capital inflows as well as real sector effects of a slowdown in global 
growth, are more important.  
ii. While the severity and duration of effects on developing countries will depend on 
dynamics at the global level, historical evidence indicates that investors only 
return cautiously and gradually to emerging and developing country markets 
following a crisis. The scale of losses and refinancing needs in advanced 
economies could well reinforce such conservatism. 
iii. Macroeconomic vulnerability, which refers to both the level and changes in 
inflation and the current account balance, is a critical determinant of the likelihood 
of a crisis developing. 
iv. An assessment of the risks facing developing countries of negative transmission 
effects reveals that the sub-group of least developed countries are comparatively 
less exposed. This can be traced to their lower degree of integration with external 
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flows (trade and capital) as well as their comparatively stronger positions across 
key macroeconomic vulnerability indicators (Table 2). 
v. Despite these findings, a watch list highlights developing countries that are more 
vulnerable to the crisis (Table 4). This list includes countries identified elsewhere 
as being at high risk – e.g., Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Burundi. However, 
Vietnam and Nicaragua also feature on the watch list due to evidence of recent 
deterioration in their macroeconomic environments combined with their 
comparatively greater dependence on external (private) financial flows. Thus, 
heightened monitoring of economic developments in these countries is 
recommended. 
vi. The risk-mapping exercise underlines the substantial diversity between developing 
countries in terms of potential vulnerabilities and relevant impact channels. For 
this reason, although broad comparative exercises are useful, they only represent a 
starting point for country-specific analysis. 
vii. From a policy viewpoint, it is important to emphasise that the crisis does not 
represent a fundamentally new set of circumstances for most developing 
countries. Rather, it exacerbates existing challenges and may limit policy options 
particularly in terms of raising external funds. 
viii. The key medium- and long-term challenge is to create a framework that ensures a 
stable and adequate flow of finance capital from richer to poorer countries. 
Changes in financial regulation and the global financial architecture are likely to 
be necessary. 
ix. The role of aid should not be ignored and will remain critical for the foreseeable 
future, particularly to support countries that have lost access to alternative sources 
of external investment finance. In light of the historical tendency of aid flows to 
fall in the wake of financial crisis in advanced countries (see Section 3), it is more 
important than ever to honour existing commitments and reinforce aid 
predictability.  
x. It would be mistaken to interpret the financial crisis as revealing a fundamental 
flaw in global integration. Certainly it reveals weaknesses, particularly in the 
functioning of financial markets which are acutely vulnerable to systemic flaws. 
These should be addressed in a concerted manner, as should the costs and benefits 
of different forms of integration for developing countries. If anything, however, 
the crisis underlines the complex and rapidly shifting nature of modern markets. 
The challenge is to understand how developing countries can adapt to and benefit 
from this ‘modern’ condition. It is this question that deserves deeper scrutiny and 
further analysis in country specific contexts. 
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Appendix A: Additional figures 
Figure A1: Changes in international reserves as % GDP (2004-2007, LDCs) 
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Figure A2: Benchmark equity indices, 01 Jan 2004 – 16 Oct 2008 (weekly, log scale) 
4.
4
4.
6
4.
8
5
5.
2
5.
4
P
ric
e 
in
de
x,
 2
00
5 
= 
10
0,
 lo
g 
sc
al
e
1Jan04 19Jun04 6Dec04 25May0511Nov05 30Apr06 17Oct06 5Apr07 22Sep07 10Mar08 27Aug08
Emerging markets (MSCI) G7 markets (MSCI)
Source: authors' calculations from Datastream
 
27 
 
Figure A3: Net portfolio and direct investment flows to emerging markets (1990-2007) 
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Figure A4: Emerging market bond spread, 15 Oct 1998 – 16 Oct 2008 (weekly) 
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Figure A5: Crisis probability and crisis-relevance components for Danida programme countries 
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Figure A6: Macro and financial vulnerability components for Danida programme countries 
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Appendix B: Sample countries and indicator scores 
 
Table B1: IDA-eligible, non-Least Developed Countries included in the sample 
 Indicators 
Country LIC Danida
Relevanc
e Macro Financial 
Armenia 0 0 0.23 -0.08 0.42 
Azerbaijan 0 0 2.05 -2.03 -0.32 
Bolivia 0 1 -0.39 -0.89 -1.71 
Cameroon 0 0 -0.96 -0.93 -0.71 
Congo, Republic 0 0 0.69 -0.36 -0.44 
Côte d'Ivoire 1 0 -0.26 -0.80 1.33 
Dominica 0 0 0.55 0.33 -0.53 
Egypt 0 1 0.41 -0.05 -0.86 
Georgia 0 0 0.90 0.93 0.09 
Ghana 1 1 0.44 0.64 0.53 
Grenada 0 0 0.89 1.16 1.21 
Guyana 0 0 2.12 0.86 -1.66 
Honduras 0 0 0.68 0.32 -0.56 
India 0 0 -0.41 -0.27 0.17 
Kenya 1 1 -0.71 0.79 -0.39 
Kyrgyz Republic 1 0 0.78 0.66 0.00 
Moldova 0 0 1.91 1.10 -0.58 
Mongolia 0 0 1.19 0.69 -0.03 
Nicaragua 0 1 0.78 1.24 0.08 
Nigeria 1 0 -0.24 -0.73 -1.54 
Pakistan 1 0 -0.67 0.36 1.62 
Papua New Guinea 1 0 2.35 -1.05 -0.80 
Sri Lanka 0 0 -0.21 1.02 0.73 
Tajikistan 1 0 2.29 0.89 0.69 
Tonga 0 0 0.24 0.40 0.69 
Vietnam 1 1 0.84 1.18 -0.30 
Note: indicators are as described in the text and Appendix B; LIC refers to low income country 
(1 = yes; 0 = no); Danida refers to Danida programme country (1 = yes; 0 = no). 
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Table B2: Least Developed Countries included in the sample 
 Indicators 
Country LIC Danida 
Relevanc
e Macro Financial 
Angola 0 0 0.73 -3.01 -1.11 
Bangladesh 1 1 -0.69 -0.28 0.16 
Benin 1 1 -1.01 -0.28 -0.31 
Bhutan 0 1 -0.93 -1.90 -2.68 
Burkina Faso 1 1 -1.52 -0.28 0.44 
Burundi 1 0 -1.46 1.50 2.02 
Cambodia 1 0 0.87 0.56 -0.40 
Cape Verde 0 0 0.62 -0.24 -2.02 
Central African Republic 1 0 1.56 -0.33 1.91 
Chad 1 0 -0.93 -2.87 0.88 
Comoros 1 0 -0.80 -0.17 0.12 
Congo, Dem. Republic 1 0 -0.93 -2.16 0.68 
Djibouti 0 0 0.17 1.52 -1.56 
Eritrea 1 0 -0.93 -0.09 0.63 
Ethiopia 1 0 -0.88 1.07 0.40 
Gambia, The 1 0 1.16 0.08 -0.02 
Guinea 1 0 -0.71 0.92 0.74 
Guinea-Bissau 1 0 -0.68 -0.60 1.29 
Haiti 1 0 0.13 -0.11 0.52 
Lao PDR 1 0 -1.35 0.08 0.28 
Lesotho 0 0 1.73 -0.81 -1.15 
Madagascar 1 0 -1.02 0.80 -0.02 
Malawi 1 0 -1.34 -0.50 2.85 
Maldives 0 0 0.07 2.83 0.90 
Mali 1 1 -0.30 -0.62 -0.08 
Mauritania 1 0 -1.30 -0.27 -0.39 
Mozambique 1 1 -0.36 -0.07 -0.22 
Nepal 1 1 -0.49 -0.39 0.13 
Niger 1 0 -1.13 -0.30 0.80 
Rwanda 1 0 -1.34 0.14 -0.73 
Senegal 1 0 -0.60 0.02 0.26 
Sierra Leone 1 0 -0.56 0.31 0.58 
Solomon Islands 1 0 0.33 0.23 -0.84 
Sudan 0 0 -0.19 0.31 1.10 
Tanzania 1 1 -0.74 0.15 0.26 
Togo 1 0 -0.07 -0.44 -0.31 
Uganda 1 1 -0.51 -0.39 -0.47 
Yemen, Republic of 1 0 -0.29 0.48 -1.70 
Zambia 1 1 0.16 -0.26 -0.07 
Note: indicators are as described in the text and Appendix B; LIC refers to low income country 
(1 = yes; 0 = no); Danida refers to Danida programme country (1 = yes; 0 = no). 
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Appendix C: Variables and data sources for construction of indicators 
Indicator / variable Period Unit Source Notes 
     
Crisis-relevance     
Portfolio investment 2005-07 % GDP IMF (2008i) Equities, bonds & syndicated loans 
Foreign Direct Investment 2003-06 % GDP IMF (2008ii) Gross inflow only 
Remittances 2007 % GDP WB (2008i) Gross inflows 
Exports 2005-06 % GDP IMF (2008ii) Goods and services 
     
Macro vulnerability     
Current account deficit 2007-08 % GDP IMF (2008iii) 
Surplus recorded with a 
negative sign 
Current account change 2000-08 % points IMF (2008iii) 
Average surplus 2000-05 
minus average 2007-08 (% 
GDP) 
Inflation level 2007-08 % IMF 
(2008iii) 
Annual rate 
Inflation change 2000-08 % points IMF (2008iii) 
Average rate 2007-08 minus 
average 2000-05 (percent.  
points) 
 
Financial vulnerability     
External debt stock 2007(4)-
08(1) % GDP JEDH (2008) Official multilateral creditors 
Liabilities to BIS banks 2007(4)-08(2) % GDP 
JEDH 
(2008), BIS 
(2008) 
Consolidated liabilities to BIS 
banks + outstanding 
international debt securities – 
local currency liabilities – 
cross-border deposits with BIS 
banks 
International reserve stock 2007(1)-
08(1) % GDP JEDH (2008) Excludes gold 
Reserves change 2008(1)-08(2) % JEDH (2008) 
Absolute change / average for 
the same period 
     
Additional variables     
ODA / GDP 2006 % GDP DAC (2008) Net ODA 
Policy 2007 Score WB (2007) 
Average of macro 
management and fiscal policy 
CPIA scores (min = 1; max = 
6)
GDP per capita 2008 Log. IMF (2008iii) Real PPP dollars 
State fragility 2008 Score FfP (2008) 
Combined score of 12 
indicators in the Failed States 
index (max = 120) 
 
 
